Brer Rabbit, after claiming repeatedly that he would prefer almost anything to being thrown into the briarpatch, 2 expressed glee once tossed there. 3 In fact, Brer Rabbit wanted to be in the briarpatch because, like most rabbits, he could navigate the briarpatch with relative ease: the briarpatch was home.
Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed a great degree of familiarity with the state action doctrine, a doctrinal briar patch. Like Brer Rabbit, the Court has disclaimed repeatedly any interest in being there. 4 Writing for the Court only last term, Justice Scalia described the state action doctrine as "difficult terrain" and deftly avoided traversing it. 5 Justice Scalia's acknowl-edgment that state action doctrine is difficult terrain is not surprising; unlike Brer Rabbit, the Court has demonstrated a seeming inability to maneuver in the underbrush once finding itself there. 6 The state action doctrine, with its intricate mantras and talismanic phrases, has been and remains a dark thicket of constitutional law.
Since at least 1879, the Court has consistently held that the guarantees of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights protect citizens only from acts committed by the government, and has required plaintiffs asserting claims under these provisions to establish the presence of "state action" before undertaking an analysis of the merits of a particular claim.7 These amendments "erect[] no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 8 The state action inquiry is not particularly difficult when an agency or officer of the government has allegedly violated the constitutional rights of an individual.9 The analytical exercise can become decidedly squirrelly, however, when the actions of an ostensibly "private" entity violate constitutional norms, and the entity enjoys some kind of special relationship or connection to the federal or a state government. 10 To be sure, the law generally -and constitutional law in particular -is often ambiguous, and judges are required to exercise discretion when deciding almost every matter that comes before them. 11 Thus, judges -like rabbits -should be reasonably comfortable in the briarpatch because their jobs routinely require them to be there. Nevertheless, the state action doctrine has proven especially difficult for the federal judiciary to administer.
In an attempt to bring order to the subject, the Supreme Court has developed three distinct tests for determining whether the rela-6. See, e.g., Evans v tionship between a private entity and the government is sufficient to justify attributing the private entity's behavior to the state.12 These tests have proven difficult to apply in practice and arguably have done little to improve either the quality or consistency of state action determinations. Largely because of the difficulties associated with applying the tests, a number of academics have seriously questioned their value as analytical tools. 1 3 In this article, I argue that the existing tests for establishing the presence of state action are helpful in framing the state action question, but, as applied by the federal courts, they have all too often frustrated meaningful inquiry into the true relationship between ostensibly private actors and the federal or a state government. Wholesale abandonment of the tests, however, will not resolve this problem. Instead, courts conducting state action analyses must go beyond the mechanical application of the traditional tests to determine if, in the totality of the circumstances, a particular private entity is a state actor. 14 Essentially, I advocate a constitutional "metaanalysis"15 that would improve the accuracy and fairness of state action determinations.
Part I presents an overview of contemporary state action doctrine, with particular attention to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation. 1 6 Part II demonstrates the shortcomings -and absurdities -associated with the contemporary state action doctrine. In this Part, I argue that recent decisions of the lower federal courts reflect a failure in practice to honor the Supreme Court's admonition that its various 12. As will be explained more fully, infra, these tests are: (1) the "exclusive government function" test, see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-62 (1978) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932); (2) the "nexus" or "regulation" test, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); and (3) the "symbiotic relationship test," see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) .
13. The state action doctrine has been described as "incoheren [ (1967) . On the other hand, the doctrine has also been described as "the most important problem in American law." See id. at 70. 14. See, e.g., Hollenbaugh v. camegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382, 385 (3d Cir.1976) (considering both an entity's public function as well as its relationship with the state in making a state action determination), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) .
15. "Meta-analysis" involves grouping data from separate scientific studies to reach the 95% confidence interval required to substantiate scientific claims. State action detenninations could be improved by incorporating a roughly analogous technique. See infra section III.A.
verbal formulations of state action are but "different ways of characterizing [a] necessarily fact-bound inquiry." 1 7 Finally, Part III takes up the broader problem of cabining judicial discretion in the application of the state action doctrine. This Part presents an alternative approach to the contemporary state action analysis, an approach that is truer to the Supreme Court's repeated exhortation that " [ o ] nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be given its true significance."1s
The federal courts' use of the various state action tests as formulaic shorthands that yield quick and easy answers represents an inappropriate application of the Supreme Court's state action precedents. Such jurisprudence has the unfortunate effect of insulating from constitutional scrutiny behavior fairly attributable to the state and is significantly underprotective of constitutional rights. The Court therefore should abandon sole reliance on these tests in favor of a more contextual approach. In short, the federal courts should return to the briarpatch, with the recognition that the state action doctrine, like Brer Rabbit, was "bred and born there."
I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE STATE ACTION

DOCTRINE
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 1 9 Since at least 1879, the Supreme Court has interpreted the "[n]o State shall" language of this clause to limit the application of the clause to acts "fairly attributable to the State." 2 0 Moreover, the Court has also applied the state action requirement to cases raising constitutional challenges to actions taken by the federal govemment. 21 Thus, in any given case, a plaintiff claiming the violation of a constitutional right or liberty must first establish 18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ; see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967 Lebron v. [Vol. 94:302 that the alleged violation is somehow the handiwork of the government.
In approaching the question of governmental responsibility for a deprivation of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has established a two-track analysis. First, a reviewing court must determine whether the defendant "is ... [the] Government itself." 22 If the defendant is not the government, then the Court must determine whether the actions of the nongovernmental entity can "be fairly attribut [ ed] to the State" 23 through a kind of contacts analysis. The nature and scope of both inquiries are described below.
A. Governmental Entities
When the defendant in a civil suit is a government agency or officer, the state action inquiry is attenuated: government agencies and officials must observe the constitutional rights and prerogatives of the citizenry. 24 Until very recently, however, it was unclear whether a governmental entity could avoid its constitutional obligations simply by incorporating a "private" company to execute a public policy. Because a corporate entity is ostensibly private or at least can be legislatively declared so, 25 lower federal courts had indicated a willingness to excuse government-owned corporations from observing constitutional rights. 26 In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 21 the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. The Court held that before examining the relationship of the federal government to Amtrak -22. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 964 (1995 (1995) .
in other words, engaging in a contacts analysis -it was first necessary to determine whether Amtrak, as a government-created, controlled, and maintained corporation, constituted a component of the federal government.2s
Lebron involved a First Amendment challenge to Amtrak's decision to refuse to permit an advertisement parodying the Coors family's alleged support of right-wing political groups in Central America. Lebron, an artist, purchased the right to display a work of art depicting Nicaraguan villagers being menaced by a silver Coors beer-can missile. 29 After Amtrak's sales agent accepted Lebron's purchase of advertising space to display the picture in New York City's Penn Station, Amtrak exercised its contractual authority with the agent to refuse the advertisement.3o Lebron then sued, claiming that Amtrak's refusal to display his work violated his First Amendment rights. Applying the three state action tests and relying on prior circuit precedents, the Second Circuit found that Amtrak could not violate Lebron's speech rights because it was not a state actor. 31
On appeal from the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court recast the question presented for review. Rather than asking whether Amtrak, as a private entity, constituted a state actor, the majority instead inquired into whether Amtrak was really a "private" entity separate and distinct from the federal government.3 2 The Court "conclude [d] [Vol. 94:302 ment creates a corporation" in order to promote "governmental objectives" and retains effective control over the corporation, the corporation is a component of the government itself. 35 The Lebron decision effectively mandates a new first step in state action analysis. Rather than assuming the private character of an entity, plaintiffs would do well to first consider whether it is plausible to argue that the entity is in fact a component of the government. 36 Consistent with Lebron, governmental agencies cannot escape the mantle of sovereignty by drawing up articles of incorporation. Essentially, Lebron appears to reject the sovereigncommercial acts dichotomy that exists in international law.37 The federal and state governments, unlike a foreign sovereign, cannot operate commercial enterprises in the same fashion as private citizens; neither the federal government nor a state government may act as a capitalist, free and clear of any constitutional constraints. 38 One could argue that Lebron stands only for the more limited proposition that a government-controlled corporation is a state actor if the government's involvement in the corporation relates to a public policy -in other words, that the government's participation in the enterprise is a kind of quasi-sovereign function. Consistent with this interpretation of Lebron, if the government's involvement with a corporation were merely accidental and did not reflect or serve an identifiable public policy objective, the corporation might not be a state actor.
Although this kind of government involvement with a corporation might be theoretically possible, most, if not all, existing 35. 115 S. Ct. at 974-75; see also Chalfant v . Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978).
In Chalfant, the Third Circuit held that the state cannot avoid its constitutional obligations by using an agent to execute its policies because a contrary rule would permit "any state [to] avoid the reach of the fourteenth amendment over any governmental function merely by turning over the administration of that function to [an agent]." 547 F.2d at 746.
36. For example, if the federal government opened a McDonald's restaurant across the street from the White House, perhaps in response to its current resident's passion for McFood, the McDonald's restaurant would be a state actor -notwithstanding the commercial nature of the enterprise -so long as the government retained control over the ownership and operation of the restaurant and opened the restaurant to promote a public policy objective. Under the FSIA, the "commercial activities" of foreign governments are not protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In other words, a foreign government may be sued in the United States for the acts or omissions of a commercial enterprise under its direct control. Thus, the FSIA treats a corporation owned or controlled by a foreign sovereign as a private, rather than a public, entity. Cf. Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concurring) (arguing that the GNMA, a wholly owned, governmentcontrolled corporation, is not a state actor because it "functions only in a traditionally nonsovereign capacity"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980 If the government can escape its constitutional obligations by resorting to the corporate form, constitutional guarantees are of little value indeed. 3 9 Make no mistake, the point is not a minor one. The violation of a particular substantive right by the government must be a matter of greater concern than violations of such rights by purely private entities. 4 o Identifying government responsibility for violations of constitutional rights is essential to maintaining the rule of law under our Constitution.
Thus, the historic willingness of federal courts to acquiesce in the government's claim that corporations it controls are not state actors and therefore are free to disregard constitutional constraints is both disturbing and deeply counterintuitive. 41 The government does not cease to be the government simply because it has assumed the form of a corporation, any more than a vampire ceases to be vampire because it has assumed the form of a bat.
A government employee's constitutional rights should therefore not be contingent on whether the employee works at the Depart-39. See 115 S. Ct. at 973. 40. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 503-11, 536-42. Chemerinsky emphatically rejects this position, arguing that any violation of a right accorded constitutional protection should be actionable regardless of whether the state is in any way involved in the violation. Id. at 509-11, 524-27. Chemerinsky's position disregards the importance of the principle of limited government enshrined in our constitutional system, see infra note 109, and the special dangers associated with government-sponsored lawlessness. Like a large and dangerous river, once the government leaves its banks, it may well prove difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. See, e.g., Korematsu v tutional rights. As a consequence, prior to Lebron, the lower federal courts often attempted to secure for such entities the same freedom of action enjoyed by their private-sector competitors.4s
The flaw in this reasoning is that the government cannot cease to be the government by virtue of incorporation. 46 If this means that government-owned and operated enterprises cannot compete effectively with their private sector counterparts, so be it; the government cannot waive the costs associated with observance of constitutional norms. 47 The alternative analysis permits the government to avoid its constitutional obligations through a procedural nicety.
Furthermore, from an economic perspective, the government can never truly act as a private entity. When the Congress or a state legislature decides to support a commercial endeavor, the business does not face the same opportunity costs or risk of failure that its private counterparts do. Federal Express, a private entity, is constrained in countless ways by market forces. For example, it cannot run deficits indefinitely; once its capital is exhausted, it will go bankrupt. Unlike Federal Express, the U.S. Postal Service, as a government-owned and operated enterprise, 48 has no real incentive to balance its books. The Postal Service does not face the specter of bankruptcy and dissolution, no matter how out of balance its expenditures and receipts. 49 Of course, when the government enters the market, it typically does so in order to achieve a particular public policy objective that might otherwise not be met by the private sector, precisely because a truly private enterprise cannot be operated on a for-profit basis or because a purely private for-profit entity might not operate in a fashion consistent with important governmental objectives. For example, operating a hospital in an isolated, sparsely populated rural county may not be cost-effective but is nevertheless quite necessary, at least from the point of view of the county's residents and their elected local officials. 50 Thus, there are usually sound reasons for the government's direct participation in the market. 51
Far from undercutting the argument for treating governmentcreated and controlled corporations as state actors, the public policy objectives underlying such activities support the argument. Government-sponsored corporations are simply a means of securing governmental objectives.
Government participation in the market, however, is not without costs to other market participants. When the government acts as a market participant, it shifts, at least in part, the cost of its inefficiencies onto other privately held competitors in the market. Government-controlled corporations also derive certain economic benefits from their association with the state.ss The market places an economic premium on an association with the government. For example, securities offered by government-controlled corporations command a premium based on the market's assumption that the federal government would probably guarantee payment of these notes in the event that the government-controlled corporation defaults.s6 These benefits provide yet another justification for treating government-controlled corporations as state actors: significant benefits flow from their formal relationship with the government.
Had the Supreme Court decided Lebron differently and held that Amtrak was not a state actor by virtue of Congress's designation of the company as nongovernmental or because of the nature of the activities, the government would have escaped its constitutional responsibilities, and private companies would have borne a size and scope, the government's involvement in the mortgage industry has profound effects on private-sector enterprises competing in the market. See Lavargna, supra note 49, at 992-95. Significantly, prior to Lebron, lower federal courts had uniformly found that these entities were not state actors. See Warren 53. Amtrak might elect to provide service to sparsely populated states because politicians from those states desire such service and possess sufficient political clout to ensure that Amtrak respects this preference. Service to such states could not be justified on an economic basis -it would drive up Amtrak's operating costs without providing an offsetting increase in Amtrak's operating revenues. nontrivial portion of the cost. 57 By requiring government-owned and operated corporations to observe constitutional rights and liberties, the Court has ensured that legislatures will not be able to avoid paying a greater share of the true cost of implementing their policy decisions.ss Under Lebron, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for a government-owned and operated entity to compete at parity with private-sector enterprises offering fungible services. This result, in turn, will force legislators to consider more carefully the costs and benefits of underwriting a commercial enterprise.s9
In sum, the first-level inquiry in any state action case arising post-Lebron will be whether the defendant is the government itself. H the defendant is a governmental officer, agency, or instrumentality, the state action inquiry is at an end: state action is present.60
B. Contacts Analysis
H the defendant is not an officer, agency, or instrumentality of the government but rather is a private individual or entity, the plaintiff must establish that the private individual's or entity's behavior should nevertheless be attributed to the state. Although the Supreme Court has established a number of different formulations of the state action inquiry at this level, three basic tests have emerged: (1) the exclusive government function test; (2) the symbiotic relationship test; and (3) the nexus test. Each of these tests requires a reviewing court to engage in a kind of contacts analysis in 58. Note also that such a rule will discourage private companies from associating themselves with government-sponsored enterprises or projects unless the government is prepared to shoulder the costs that the company will incur incident to its new "state actor" status.
59. Although private sector enterprises will still suffer from government-subsidized competition, the costs of complying with the due process and free speech guarantees of the Constitution will force governmental corporations to charge higher prices or to obtain larger governmental subsidies. Higher prices will lead consumers to favor fungible private-sector alternatives, and higher government subsidies will force legislators to think twice before establishing a government-sponsored enterprise. This is not to say that the government should never sponsor essentially commercial enterprises. Rather, the government should do so advisedly and only after assessing the full costs associated with a particular endeavor, including the externalities.
60. This leaves open the question of how one goes about deciding that a particular entity "is" the government itself. As will be discussed more fully, infra, the Supreme Court en-
gaged in an open-ended analysis of Amtrak's "nature and history" in order to detennine whether it constitutes a component of the federal government. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 967; see also infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
which the court examines both the nature of the defendant and the relationship between the defendant's behavior and the government.
Challenges to an Existing Rule of Law
At the outset, it is important to note that contacts analysis is necessary only if the validity of a state or federal law is not directly at issue; if a party to a suit is challenging the constitutionality of a state or federal law, state action is present, even if a private party, rather than the state, is attempting to enforce the particular law. Thus, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 61 the Supreme Court found that the state action requirement was satisfied in a suit between two private parties:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised. 62 The Supreme Court has repeatedly followed this holding in the thirty years since New York Times was decided.63
Perhaps the best example of this approach is Shelley v. Kraemer, 64 the (in)famous pre-New York Times case in which the Supreme Court declared the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants to be unlawful state action. In Shelley, the Supreme Court found that "the particular patterns of discrimination and the areas in which the restrictions are to operate, are determined, in the first instance, by the terms of agreements among private individuals. "65 The Court went on to explain, however, that the action of state courts in enforcing a substantive common law rule formulated by those courts, may result in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the judicial proceedings in such cases may have been in complete accord with the most rigorous conceptions of procedural due process. 66 The Court held that the enforcement of a state's common law rule constituted state action; the common law rule at issue was the law of property permitting landowners to establish restrictive covenants running with the land. 67 The Court found that the state's common laws in question facilitated and perhaps encouraged private discriminatory behavior and were therefore unconstitutional. 68 "[I]t would appear beyond question that the power of the State to create and enforce property interests must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment."69
Shelley has proven controversial because it could be read to mean that any court involvement in an essentially private dispute satisfies the state action requirement. 1 0 Under this interpretation of Shelley, court involvement will transform private contract or property disputes into matters subject to the constitutional restrictions applicable to the government's behavior. 71 Shelley, however, need not be construed so broadly. When one considers the fact that the common law of property generally disfavors the enforcement of restrictive covenants running with the land,72 the opinion is much eas- 72. "Beginning with an early case, the English courts expressed a policy against the running at law of the burden of a covenant between owners in fee." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.14 (A.J. Casner ed., 1952). This reflects a social policy against restrictions encumbering the productive use of land. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, div. V, pt. III, intr. note, at 3156-60 (1944); see also id. § 537 cmt. a ("Unless a burden has some compensating advantage which prevents it from being on the whole a deterrent to land use and development, the running of the promise by which it was created is not permitted."); see also Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 497 n.50 (1962) (describing how the common law did not favor "covenants restraining alienation indefinitely or for long periods" and suggesting that racially restrictive covenants fell within this prohibition). Thus, courts will refuse to enforce restrictive covenants that decrease the social utility of a parcel of land without conferring an offsetting benefit. See, e.g., Price v. Anderson, 56 A.2d 215, 219-21 (Pa. 1948) (refusing to enforce a restrictive covenant because such action would unduly impede development). In consequence, one can think of Shelley as a case in which the state courts were required to decide whether a racially restrictive covenant conferred more social benefit than cost on the use of property; here is where the Fourteenth Amendment enters the scene. Although racial integration of a neighborhood in 1948 might have caused property values to fall, avoiding a potential decrease in property values that would be directly attributable to racial prejudice is not the kind of social benefit that the state may secure through a discretionary application of its law of property. Consider and contrast the law of trespass, which enforces the property holder's right to deny access to real property generally and without regard to the social costs and benefits associated with such behavior.
ier to understand. Rather than finding state action because of a court's enforcement of a private contract, the state's policy of selectively enforcing restrictive covenants reflected a decision to facilitate some kinds of private behavior but not others. 73 If only a handful of restrictive covenants would be honored, it is odd indeed that the state would elect to make a raci_ally restrictive covenant one of the chosen few.74
In sum, a contacts analysis is necessary only if the underlying state or federal statutory or common law is not constitutionally infirm.1s
The Contacts Analysis Tests
The Supreme Court's contacts analysis state action tests are somewhat deceptive, insofar as their language holds out the promise of precise, predictable results. Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes acted as though the application of these tests were little 73 . Shelley could also be characterized as a "nexus" case, insofar as it involves a challenge to private behavior taken at the behest of the state. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
74. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) . A hypothetical demonstrates the reasonableness of this approach. Under the common law, certain kinds of commercial enterprises had an obligation to provide services upon the tender of a tariffed fee. Thus, innkeepers and ferrymen were legally obliged to render service without regard to the identity of the person seeking the service, with certain narrow exceptions. See 3 WILLIAM BLACK-STONE, COMMENTARIES 166 (11th ed. 1791); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296-300 {1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that the common law rule protected citizens' access to public accommodation); Uston v. Resorts Intl. Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 373-75 (N.J. 1982) (holding the common law right to exclude, with respect to property owners who open their premises to the public, is limited by the common law right to reasonable access to public places). See generally 1873 Miss. Laws, ch. 63, § 1, at 67 (codifying the common law rule requiring common carriers and innkeepers to provide service to all comers). But see Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877) (invalidating a Louisiana statute prohibiting common carriers from segregating on the basis of race on Commerce Clause grounds).
Suppose that the government permitted such enterprises to refuse service on the basis of Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated that then-Justice Rehnquist's dicta in Flagg Brothers was a bit overbroad; although education and fire protection are quintessential government functions, the provision of these services is apparently not sufficiently "exclusive" to the government to support a finding of state action when education or fire protection services are delegated to private entities. 80 "That a private entity performs a function which serves the public does not make its acts state action." 81 Without a doubt, the exclusivity requirement severely inhibits the utility of the exclusive government function test. Beyond holding elections,82 empaneling juries,s3 and operating jails and pris- professor appointed to a one-year term pursuant to a contract did not enjoy a legitimate govern a private employer's particular employment practices. Accordingly, an employee working for a private employer may claim the benefit of pre-termination process as a matter of right only if the government can somehow be deemed responsible for the private employer's termination decision. The nexus test often provides the best means of establishing such responsibility.
C. Putting It All Together
The state action doctrine as currently constructed requires courts to engage in a three-step process. First, the court must determine whether the defendant is an agent of the govemment.99 If not, the Court must then determine whether the claim effectively raises a challenge to a positive state or federal law. 10° Finally, if the case does not challenge the validity of a state or federal law but rather the enforcement of a private preference through an admittedly valid state or federal law, the court must engage in contacts analysis.10 1
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A great deal of scholarly energy has been devoted to pointing out the shortcomings of the state action doctrine, 102 and it would be both impossible and unproductive to catalOg all of these efforts. A expectation of continued employment and therefore did not enjoy a protected property interest in his job).
99. See supra section I.A; see also Lebron v brief overview of the scholarship in this area, however, will illustrate the principal objections to the doctrine as it presently exists.
Legal scholarship about the state action doctrine has been a feast or famine affair. In the not-so-distant past, the state action problem was a prime focus of scholarly efforts as the legal academy tried to understand and make sense of the Supreme Court's analytical gyrations; there was a plethora of writings about state action in the 1960s. Scholarly interest in the topic has waned since then, however, not because the problem has gone away, but because many academics lost interest in trying to bring order to the morass of tests, holdings, and approaches that have emanated from the Supreme Court.103
Oddly, however, contemporary scholarship about the state action doctrine has been as extreme as it is rare. Some of the most recent scholarly proposals either advocate abandoning the state action doctrine completely, in favor of some form of rights balancing104 or suggest state action tests that would effectively transform almost all private behavior into state action.10s On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not indicated any significant interest in substantially revising its state action jurisprudence. The virtuous mean between the two extremes 106 lies neither in abandoning the quest for consistent and intuitively rational state action determinations nor in slavishly hewing to the existing precedents without regard to the absurd results that flow from their formalistic application.101 )). Because most employees enjoy statutory protection from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and religion, there is correspondingly less of a need to puzzle over whether a particular employer's actions reasonably could be attributed to the government. House seat decided by only twenty-one votes). The state provided the ballot and did not prohibit the voter from exercising his vote in a racially discriminatory fashion. I would argue that the minority candidate has not suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right that must be balanced against the voter's interest in exercising his ballot for such reasons as he deems fit and proper. This is so because voting is an area in which the state must remain neutral, enforcing the preferenC:es of individual voters without regard to whether the state itself could hold those preferences. See Henkin, supra note 72, at 490-91 & n.39, 498 ("Since the state cannot prevent the discrimination, it is not responsible for it.").
[Vol. 94:302 apparent lack of consistency in the application of the doctrine.110
By examining the shortcomings of the state action doctrine through the prism of concrete cases, one can both better identify the particular shortcomings that have led so many to question the utility of the state action doctrine and propose a revised framewo,rk for making state action determinations that might overcome or lessen the effect of these shortcomings.
A. Riding With the Lord: The Lebron Redux
Imagine the consternation of many, if not most, of the passengers on an Amtrak metroliner train if the engineer, before pulling out of Union Station in Washington, D.C., announced over the intercom, "Let's all bow our heads before we begin our trip .... You should know that Jesus will be our co-pilot!" Such a blatantly sectarian message in the context of. secular travel aboard a government-subsidized train would be jarring, to say the least. Yet, if Amtrak is not a state actor, it is free of the constraints of the First Amendment, including the Establishment Clause, and can take positions on matters of faith in its place of business, just like any cab driver or hamburger stand owner. 111
Under the Court's traditional contacts analysis tests, Amtrak probably would not qualify as a state actor. 112 A mechanical application of the exclusive government function, symbiotic relationship, and nexus tests leads, perhaps inexorably, to the conclusion that Amtrak is not a state actor. In Lebron, the Supreme Court deftly avoided the application of its contacts analysis state action tests simply by recasting the question presented for review. Had the Court applied these tests, however, the Second Circuit's decision would probably have been affirmed. 113 Although there has been a long tradition of government support of passenger and cargo rail service,11 4 passenger rail service in the United States cannot be fairly characterized as an "exclusive government function." 115 Unlike police, fire, and sanitation services,11 6 the government has not historically shouldered primary responsibility for the provision of railroad transportation. Turning to the nexus test, one finds that Amtrak receives federal funds and is subject to federal statutory and regulatory obligations. The level of funding and the degree of regulation, however, are probably not sufficient to satisfy Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison.117 The regulations are far from pervasive, and the federal government's funding constitutes but a portion of Amtrak's total receipts. us
The "symbiotic relationship" test supports the strongest argument one can make for treating Amtrak as a state actor under the Court's pre-Lebron state action jurisprudence. 119 The federal government's relationship to Amtrak could be characterized as interdependent, with corporate officials regularly answering to federal officials, including the Congress, about their business decisions. 12 0 At least arguably, the federal government has "so far insinuated 114. The federal and state governments provided both direct and indirect subsidies to railroads to facilitate the building of a national rail system. See CARTER GooDRICH, Gov. itself into a position of interdependence with" Amtrak that it really is "a joint participant" in the business venture.121 Both Justice O'Connor -dissenting in Lebron -and the Second Circuit, however, found that Amtrak and the federal government were not in a symbiotic relationship.1 22 Justice O'Connor reasoned that because a member of Amtrak's management was directly responsible for the alleged deprivation of Lebron's First Amendment rights, the act could not be attributed to the government.123 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, simply deferred to Congress's designation of Amtrak as a "nongovernmental" entity.124 Regardless of the precise reasoning employed, under the Court's pre-Lebron state action jurisprudence, it is possible -and perhaps probable -for an entity such as Amtrak to escape responsibility for observing the constitutional rights of its employees and customers.
ERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS
The point is not a minor one: the Lebron decision does not apply to cases in which the defendant is not arguably a component of the government itself. In cases involving more than nominally private defendants, lower federal courts must continue to apply the three traditional contacts analysis state action tests.
Nor was the Second Circuit's treatment and Justice O'Connor's proposed treatment of Amtrak anomalous. The Supreme Court's pre-Lebron state action jurisprudence, coupled with the lower federal courts' eagerness to permit the government to shed the mantle of sovereignty by legislative fiat, led to a raft of rather unconvincing opinions that rely entirely on formalistic analyses to avoid holding government-sponsored and controlled corporations accountable for observing constitutional norms. Indeed, the federal courts have demonstrated an amazing consistency in holding that governmentcontrolled corporations are not state actors under the traditional state action tests. Trme and again, federally chartered and controlled corporate entities have escaped constitutional liabilities on the theory that the sovereign is free to act as a private entity and need only declare an entity "nongovernmental" to achieve this objective, notwithstanding the fundamentally public character of the corporation's existence. In addition to Amtrak, federal courts have found the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), 1 25 the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), 126 and the Government National Mortgage Corporation (GNMA) 127 to be "private" entities for purposes of imposing constitutional obligations. The CPB, however, to take one example, exists solely to administer federally funded grants to support educational television stations and programming, and is functionally little different from the National Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities. To take a second example, one cannot seriously question the public character of the LSC. 1 28 Plainly, Amtrak, the CPB, the LSC, the GNMA, and similar entities represent constituent components of the federal government, notwithstanding Congress's declaration to the contrary. Indeed, Lebron casts serious doubt on the continuing validity of decisions that reach a contrary result. The majority's decision should effectively preclude governmental entities from shirking their constitutional duties by delegating the implementation of public functions to ostensibly "private" government-controlled entities. 129 As noted above, however, Lebron does not affect the ability of the government to implement policies through truly private entities. Lebron's formal reach is limited to entities in which the government maintains both a substantial equity position and de jure control. 130 Accordingly, although Lebron cases in which the defendant is more than nominally private.131 Because the traditional state action tests, as applied, have failed to ferret out routinely and consistently actions "fairly attributable to the government," reform of the state action doctrine remains something of a work in progress.
B. Catching Local Fire Companies in a Dysfunctional Net
Tue current state action doctrine can be conceptualized as a fishing net with very wide holes, at least insofar as it applies to the behavior of more-than-nominally private entities.132 Although the tests are capable of catching the biggest fish, many small-and medium-sized fish routinely slip through unhindered. Given the government's relationship with Amtrak, it is difficult to fathom a better example of a "private" entity that should be deemed a state actor. Yet, for over two decades, every lower federal court to consider the question concluded that Amtrak was not a state actor.133
Lebron now undermines the flawed reasoning that led courts to declare entities like Amtrak, the CPB, and the LSC to be free of constitutional obligations. Other similarly troubling results, however, are unaffected by the Lebron decision. Tue traditional state action tests -which the Supreme Court majority avoided applying in Lebron -are alive and well and, because they are often applied formalistically, will continue to work serious mischief.
Federal courts' treatment of the constitutional status of volunteer fire companies provides an excellent example of the shortcomings of the current state action doctrine because fire companies execute a quintessential "public" service that historically has not been an "exclusive" state function, they usually labor under state laws and some regulations, and they enjoy public financial support. Similar entities include libraries, hospitals, and primary and secondary schools. The treatment of volunteer fire companies provides meaningful guidance about the state-actor status of nominally private entities providing these public services.
Leading the charge, the Fifth Circuit, _applying the Supreme Court's traditional contacts-based state action tests, has held that a volunteer fire company is not a state actor. Most people -including the Chief Justice -view fire protection as an essential public service. 134 In order to satisfy the Supreme Court's state action requirement, however, fire protection must not be an "essential" public service but rather an "exclusive government function." 135 That is to say, the historical provision of a particular service by private parties will preclude a finding of state action under the exclusive government function test, even if government would have to provide the service in the absence of private companies.
In an opinion written by Judge Edith Jones, the Fifth Circuit held that the McGregor Volunteer Fire Department was not a state actor, and it therefore had no obligation to respect the First Amendment rights of its members. 13 6 Applying the three state action tests seriatim, the Court held that the fire company did not satisfy any one of the tests completely. 137 The court conceded that local governments often provide fire protection service but noted that, in some jurisdictions, private companies have assumed this duty. 13 8 Significantly, the Yeager court made no effort to consider the governmental nature of the fire protection services, the existence of state regulations, and the state subsidies in tandem. At no point did the court step back and examine the forest; instead, its analysis went from tree to tree.
This kind of constitutional myopia is not uncommon. In Haavistola v. Community Fire Company, 140 a case with substantially similar facts, a federal district judge reached the same result and used like reasoning. In that case, the court considered -and rejected -five separate theories of state action potentially applicable to the fire company. 141 In consequence, the court held that the volunteer fire company was free to practice gender-based discrimination against female firefighters. Had the court considered the various connections between the state of Maryland and the fire company conjunctively, rather than singly and in insolation, the court could have reached a different conclusion.142
The Yeager and Haavistola courts rigidly applied the particular formulations of state action handed down by the Supreme Court, but they failed to honor the Court's admonition that reviewing fact that the instrumentality to whom the responsibility has been delegated once operated, in the dim and distant past, as a private institution."). LEXIS 12492, at *6-*12 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (4th Cir. May 31, 1994). The problem, of course, is that the Fourth Circuit goofed in Haavistola: although the subsidiary facts necessary to determine whether the Rising Sun fire company was a state actor were within the province of the jury, the legal significance of those facts was a question of law, appropriately reserved to the court. Because the parties in Haavistola did not dispute any of the subsidiary questions of fact, there was no role for the jury in determining whether the fire company was a state actor. courts must "sift[] facts and weigh[ ] circumstances"143 in order to "determine whether the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to a particular case." 144 This approach resulted in decisions that simply do not reflect a basic reality: citizens expect their government to protect them from the danger of fire.14s
Firefighters provide a service that is as closely and traditionally associated with state and local governments as the services provided by police officers, judges, tax collectors, and prison officials.146 To be sure, firefighting once was an activity conducted by private organizations that were largely, if not completely, unregulated by state or local governments. 14 7 Firefighting, however, long ago evolved from a poorly organized, ad hoc affair of citizens with leather buckets into a government-sponsored, governmentregulated service, with the states conferring plenary powers of entry and arrest on firefighters to ensure the safety of lives and property.14s
The importance of the legal status of a volunteer fire department cannot be underestimated. For example, a volunteer firefighter's ability to exercise her First Amendment rights could prove crucial to the safety and welfare of a community. If a company is not properly trained, is using outdated equipment, or lacks 146. Some cities, however, choose to contract out the responsibility for providing fire protection. See MALCOLM GETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE URBAN FIRE DEPARTMENT 11 (1979) . Even in those instances where a municipality elects to contract for fire protection services, however, it must retain substantial control over the contractor. adequate staffing, the community needs to know about it. In the context of public employment, the Supreme Court has recognized a free-speech easement in government workplaces to facilitate speech concerning matters of public concem.1 4 9 Volunteer firefighters subject to summary discharge or other forms of punishment will think twice before speaking out about problems with the local fire company. The logic of these arguments has not been entirely lost on the federal judiciary. The Second Circuit, applying the exclusive government function and symbiotic relationship tests in tandem, held in Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department 1 50 that volunteer fire companies in Connecticut were state actors for purposes of applying the First Amendment, explaining that "the function of fire protection is sufficiently 'associated with sovereignty' " to justify a finding of state action. 1 5 1 The court observed that " [t] here are few governmental interests more compelling than that of protection from fire" and also noted that Connecticut law vested volunteer firefighters with "certain powers traditionally associated with sovereignty." 152 The Fifth Circuit disregarded Janusaitis in Yeager, deeming the decision "archai[c]," 1 5 3 whereas the district court in Haavistola distinguished the case on factual grounds. 154 Neither court recognized the real significance of Janusaitis, which was the Second Circuit's comprehensive approach to the state action question. 155 Instead of mechanically going through the motions of a state action analysis, the court in Janusaitis carefully weighed the facts in order to make an accurate state action determination.
149. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (seeking to strike "'a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees' " (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))). 
C. State Action Doctrine as a Playschool Cobbler's Bench
Almost every child is familiar with the "Cobbler's Bench," a shape-learning toy featuring a mallet, a small wooden "cobbler's bench," and brightly colored plastic shapes, including a circle, a square, and a triangle. The state action doctrine, as currently practiced, is something of a Cobbler's Bench: when presented with the need to make a state action determination, the federal courts compare the facts of a particular case, the shape, to each of the three state action tests, the holes. If the shape fits into one of the holes, the state action requirement is satisfied. If the shape does not fit exactly into one of the holes, however, courts too often conclude that state action is absent.
Courts do not know what to make of parabolas and trapezoids; in consequence, the federal courts disregard essential facts when applying a particular state action test, even though it may not be possible to make an accurate assessment of the entity's constitutional status without consideration of all potentially relevant factors conjunctively. 15 6 Judges, like frustrated young cobblers, need the flexibility to create openings that accommodate a variety of shapes.
Instead of using the Supreme Court's shorthands as analytical guideposts -which is all the various state action formulations are and all the Supreme Court has ever purported them to be -the lower federal courts have treated the state action tests as hard-andfast limitations on the liability of ostensibly private entities for constitutional violations. If any one of the tests does not perfectly describe a particular person or entity, that person or entity is not a state actor, even if it has characteristics that meet some aspect of each of the tests. 1 s1 In consequence, unconstitutional behavior that has its genesis with the government goes unremedied.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's attempt to provide the lower federal courts with guidance on making state action determinations -an inquiry that it has described as essentially "fact based" and requiring consideration of "nonobvious" factors -has devolved into a mechanical, formalistic application of the state action tests. The net effect of the Supreme Court's guid?nce has been to reduce the quality of the reasoning exhibited in the lower federal courts' state action determinations, 158 enabling the lower federal courts to avoid an approach that would require them to explore and explain the specific context in which claims of state action arise. To be sure, there is an inherent tension between the creation and use of judicial shorthands in the quest for equal treatment and the need for judges to have the flexibility to exercise discretion to fit legal rules to the facts of particular cases.159 Plainly, the state action doctrine reflects the assumption that reliance on structured rules will result in less arbitrary results than the alternative approach: directed, but largely unfettered, judicial discretion.
Constitutional law, however, is not Euclidean geometry: it is an exercise in persuasion, not mathematical proof. 1 6° As Professor Wechsler put it, "[t]he virtue or demerit of a judgment turns ... entirely on the reasons that support it and their adequacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees" and on its ability "to maintain the rejection of a claim that any [other] given choice should be decreed. " 161
The contemporary state action doctrine too easily permits courts to avoid responsibility for making and explaining individualized state action determinations regarding the culpability of the government for constitutional wrongs committed by private entities. As such, it must either be abandoned or reformed. Because the proposals put forth for abandoning the doctrine would have significant, negative consequences on the freedom of private action, 1 62 the state action doctrine must be reformed.
ID. MAKING THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE WORK
Notwithstanding the shortcomings associated with the state action doctrine as it presently exists, it should not be abandoned. The state action doctrine preserves a sphere of individual freedom of action, a freedom of action that would be reduced significantly were the Supreme Court to jettison the doctrine in favor of some sort of ad hoc rights balancing.16 3 The state action doctrine also properly reflects and helps to preserve the theoretical priority of the individual over the state. 1 64 Because the individual citizen is prior to the state -that is to say, the state exercises authority derived from individual citizens and not vice versa -the state cannot legitimately be deemed responsible for a private citizen's each and every act.16s At the same time, government can and should be held accountable for actions that it commands or encourages. The trick, of course, is striking the proper balance between the competing and conflicting goals of protecting individual liberty and requiring government fealty to constitutional commands.
Even if one embraces the state action doctrine as a necessary theoretical construct, one can still take the position that it could be significantly improved. The contemporary state action doctrine unbor's son to my daughter's birthday party because of his race and religious beliefs, and the neighbor, son in tow, arrives at my home to attend the party. If, in troglodyte fashion, I refuse to admit either the neighbor or his son and, moreover, have recourse to the local police to enforce my wish that they leave my property, can the neighbor sue me for a deprivation of his constitutional rights? Consistent with both Chemerinsky's and Snyder's theories of state action, I could be sued and made to answer for my refusal to include my neighbor's son in my daughter's birthday festivities. Chemerinsky would apparently permit the suit without regard to the involvement of the local police. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 537-38. Snyder would first require the local police department's involvement. See Snyder, supra note 102, at 1094. In either case, my ability to select my social acquaintances would be severely circumscribed, even if I ultimately were to prevail in fending off my neighbor's suit. Under these theories, countless private social and religious organizations who rely upon the state to enforce their property rights would be subject to litigation that would have a chilling effect on the exercise of those rights.
163. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 533-42. 164. See supra note 109; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ("One great object of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law."); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) 165. Put differently, the state's failure to prohibit a particular course of action by an individual citizen should not be deemed an endorsement of the particular behavior.
reasonably immunizes government-sponsored conduct from constitutional scrutiny because federal courts, including the Supreme Court, apply the state action tests both formalistically and in isolation.
Formalism, broadly defined, is the strict application of a rule.166 While such application serves to ensure a high degree of predictability in results, 167 courts can enforce rule formality too strictly, even to the extreme of enforcing a rule when the reasons behind the rule are not present. 16 8 The federal courts' treatment of the exclusive government functions test provides a rich example of this problem. 169 The Supreme Court has also acquiesced in the lower courts' application of each state action test in isolation.17° Thus, it is possible for an entity to enjoy some modicum of government control, regulation, funding, and so on and to perform a service associated with the government but not exclusively reserved to it and still not be a state actor. 171 In many instances, if courts applied the tests in tandem, the state action requirement would be satisfied. 1 72
A. The Importance of a Substantive Approach to State Action Determinations: The Need for Meta-Analysis
Tue state action doctrine would benefit from borrowing an analytical device developed by the scientific community: meta-analysis. In the sciences, a study must have a 95% confidence rate before it will be accepted as valid. 173 A study with a confidence rate less than 95% is not accorded dispositive weight.174 In a rough sort of way, this corresponds to the requirement that a defendant satisfy a particular state action test completely before a court will find the presence of state action.
There is, however, an emerging trend within the scientific community toward the adoption of a new procedure called "metaanalysis."17s Meta-analysis involves the grouping together of data from studies with confidence rates of less than 95% in order to create a single study with a confidence rate that equals or exceeds 95%.176 Evidently, a growing number of scientists believe that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Thus, using metaanalysis, it is possible to reach the requisite 95% confidence level, even if none of the individual studies used in the meta-analysis meets the 95% threshold.111
The state action doctrine would plainly benefit from the explicit use of meta-analysis. When a particular defendant does not satisfy any one of the three state action tests, a reviewing court should step back and consider whether the defendant satisfies a sufficient portion of each of the three tests to support a state action finding, even if no single test is satisfied completely.
In fact, a number of the circuit courts of appeals have taken this approach when deciding hard cases. In each instance, the use of a meta-analysis permitted the reviewing court to make a more refined state action determination.
In insignificant, yet, when the studies are looked at collectively, a majority of the data may be moderately or strongly contradictory to the null hypothesis.").
178. 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 94:302 presented with the question whether an ostensibly private library was a state actor. According to the plaintiff, the Wilmington Institute had discharged her on the basis of her gender and had also failed to provide her with adequate post-deprivation process.179
The Institute responded by asserting that, as a private entity, it was not required to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.180 Even though the Wilmington Institute did not fully satisfy any one of the Supreme Court's state action tests, the Third Circuit nevertheless found that the library was a state actor. The court appeared to rest its holding on a number of individually important, but not decisive, facts: (1) library services, although not an exclusive state function, were a traditional state function; (2) the library received significant public funding; and (3) the library's management structure was subject to state regulation. 181 Essentially, the Chalfant court engaged in a meta-analysis: it took bits and pieces from each of the state action tests, applied them conjunctively, and found that in the "totality of the circumstances," the library was a state actor. 182 Significantly, it is doubtful that the Wilmington Institute satisfied any one of the Supreme Court's contemporary tests. Library services, although associated with the state, are not the "exclusive" province of the government. 1 83 Furthermore, the government did not control a majority of the library's governing board or determine library policies184 nor was there any evidence to suggest that the government encouraged or coerced the Institute to discharge Chalfant.185 Finally, the state did not derive any direct economic benefit from the library nor was the state immediately identifiable with the 193 William Franz sued the U.S. government, arguing that it had violated his constitutional right of privacy and failed to provide him with due process before facilitating his former wife's decision to deny him all access to his children. 194 The threshold question for the court was whether Catherine Franz's decision to deny William Franz his visitation rights was attributable to the federal government.
After conducting an openended inquiry, the court concluded that it was reasonable to hold (Vol. 94:302 the federal government responsible for Catherine Franz's actions. 195 The court initially rested its holding on the nexus test, noting that "[t]he nexus is formed principally by the defendants' encouragement and support of Catherine's decision to hide the children from William." 1 9 6 The court further explained that "[t]he encouragement of Catherine's choice may well be the most important factor in this case." 1 9 7 It was not, however, the only factor to be considered.
" Franz was properly decided, however, even though no one state action test was truly satisfied. First, there was something of a symbiotic relationship between the federal government and Catherine Franz; the government wanted her testimony and provided her with a new identity in exchange for her assistance. Her new identity, in tum, and the government's refusal to breach its promise of secrecy precluded William Franz from bringing an appropriate child custody action against his ex-wife. Moreover, the government did facilitate Catherine Franz's behavior by refusing to tell William Franz her whereabouts. Finally, the whole course of events took place in the overall context of the federal witness protection program, an exclusive government function. Thus, while no one state action test was completely satisfied, all three tests were satisfied to a substantial degree.
Franz, Janusaitis, and Chalfant demonstrate how a state action determination can tum on whether the reviewing court takes seriously the Supreme Court's admonition to ''sift facts" and "weigh circumstances" in order to ferret out "nonobvious" state involvement in ostensibly private behavior. 205 In these cases, the reviewing courts examined all aspects of the relationship between the government and an ostensibly private defendant and concluded that, in the totality of the circumstances, the defendant was a state actor. 2 0 6 [Vol. 94:302 Essentially, the Franz, Janusaitis, and Chalfant courts engaged in the legal equivalent of meta-analysis: they found that the whole created from the separate parts was greater than the sum of the parts. In so doing, they correctly identified the government's ultimate responsibility for ostensibly private conduct and thereby held the government constitutionally accountable for that conduct.
B. Making Hard Cases Easier
Only by expanding the state action inquiry -thereby requiring the lower federal courts to cast their analytical nets more broadly -can actions "fairly attributable to the State" be identified accurately. There is, of course, a place for shorthands, and if an entity fully satisfies the criteria set forth in a particular state action test, a reviewing court need not belabor its state action analysis. If an entity does not fully satisfy any one of the tests, however, reviewing courts have a professional2°7 -if not constitutional -obligation to consider the available evidence of state action in the totality of the circumstances and deduce on a case-by-case basis whether the particular activity complained of had its genesis with the state.
If such an approach were adopted, 20 s a number of cases would have been decided differently. The volunteer fire company cases provide an easy example. If a court examines the question broadly, the nature of the service and the existence of state funding and regulations will together compel a finding of state action in almost all instances. 20 9 This would have the effect of significantly increasing the burden on federal judges charged with making state action determinations, without necessarily providing any significant offsetting improvement in the accuracy of such determinations. In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court held that a privately owned and operated secondary school was not a state actor. 213 The plaintiff class included five teachers and one vocational counselor, all of whom worked at the New Perspectives School, a facility that educated students with alcohol, drug, or behavioral problems. 214 The vocational counselor, Rendell-Baker, had been hired through a federal grant to the school and was discharged over disagreements regarding the school's hiring policies. 215 The five other plaintiffs had written a letter critical of the school's administration to a local newspaper and had attempted to form a union. 216 All six sued the school, claiming that it had failed to provide them with due process and violated their First Amendment rights. 2 11
The New Perspectives School claimed that it was not a state actor and therefore did not -indeed could not -violate any of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The Supreme Court agreed and held that the school was not a state actor. 218 In so doing, the Court disregarded a number of facts that supported the plaintiffs' contention that the school should be deemed a state actor: (1) secondary education is a service generally associated with the government; (2) the state relied upon the school to meet the community's need to educate young citizens with drug, alcohol, or behavioral problems; (3) the state heavily regulated the school; and ( 4) 90-99% of the (Vol. 94:302 school's annual budget came from the state.219
Mechanically proceeding through the state action tests, Chief Justice Burger failed to consider collectively the evidence supporting a state action finding. His majority opinion held that education, although associated with the government, is not an "exclusive" function of the government. 22 0 It separately explained that neither significant public funding nor government regulations can establish state action. 221 Finally, the Court opined that although the school met a community need, it did not stand in a symbiotic relationship with the state because the state did not share in the profits generated by the schooi.222
In dissent, Justice Marshall conceded that education was not an exclusive state function and that funding and regulation by themselves do not transform an entity into a state actor. 223 Notwithstanding these weaknesses, however, he observed that "the fact that a private entity is performing a vital public function, when coupled with other factors demonstrating a close connection with the State, may justify a finding of state action. " 224 Justice Marshall argued that a "more sensitive and flexible" interpretation of the state action requirement was needed to analyze properly the relationship of the state to the school. 225 Essentially, Justice Marshall engaged in meta-analysis: he acknowledged that no single test had been satisfied but argued that if viewed collectively, the whole of the evidence exceeded the sum of the parts. Had the majority viewed the facts "in the totality of the circumstances," it would have found the school to be a state actor.226
In sum, the incorporation of meta-analysis in state action analysis would plainly provide more accurate state action determinations because courts would be put to the burden of explaining their state action determinations with particularity and care; the mere invocation of the watchwords or "catch-phrases" 227 of the state action precedents would not satisfy a reviewing court's obligations.
Such an approach would also lead courts to reach intuitively correct state action determinations with greater frequency. The Second Circuit's holding in Lebron that Amtrak was not a state actor is unconvincing, 228 just as the Fifth Circuit's decision in Yeager lacks persuasive force. 229 The Supreme Court's reasoning in Lebron is compelling not only because it comports with one's general sense of Amtrak's proper legal status but also because the majority engaged in a broad factual inquiry regarding the fundamental nature of Amtrak and its relationship to the federal government. 2 30 In approaching the question whether Amtrak was a component of the federal government, the Supreme Court considered Amtrak's history, its business practices, its financial structure, and its corporate control structure. 231 No one factor or set of factors was dispositive by itself. Rather, in the totality of the circumstances, a particular corporation constituted a component of the federal government. State action inquiries in cases involving truly private entiThus, the state had directly passed on her qualifications to hold the position of vocational counselor and provided the funds to pay for her salary. The state's involvement in the hiring and retention of Rendell-Baker, coupled with the nature of the institution and the public need it met within the community, veritably compels a conclusion that, at least with respect to Rendell-Baker, the New Perspectives School was a state actor. Even if the five teachers employed by the school without direct state supervision could not establish state action, surely Rendell-Baker's situation was materially different; however, neither the majority nor the dissent made this distinction. ties 232 should be no less open-ended, probing, or careful.
In a variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has refused to accord dispositive weight to a single factor or criterion when applying a particular constitutional provision or rule. 233 There is no reason to treat state action determinations any differently. The facts material to satisfying any given state action test should be collectively relevant, and the tests themselves should be applied conjunctively to ensure that the federal courts make accurate -and intuitively correct -state action determinations.
Of course, hard cases will remain. Although more probing factual analyses would yield better -in other words, more accurate -state action determinations, such an approach would not necessarily make deciding state action questions any simpler. On the contrary, the mandate of a more probing analysis would require a reviewing court to expend greater effort in many cases because it would have to puzzle through the intricacies of the relationship between private entities and the government, both singly and collectively.
Still, the game is worth the candle if one is committed to holding the government to its constitutional responsibilities. As Professor Henkin pointed out, "No algebraic formula nor any conjuring with the words of the Constitution can define with precision the limits of the state's choices." 234 Analytical shortcuts in state action determinations might save time and effort, but these savings come at the price of government-sponsored lawlessness. Such a price is simply too high to pay.
IV. CONCLUSION
The state action doctrine is a necessary analytical construct; it permits courts to hold the government accountable and protects the freedom of individual citizens to make fundamental decisions about 232. By this, I mean corporate entities that are not controlled by the government. 234. Henkin, supra note 72, at 488. their economic, social, religious, and personal relationships.235 For the construct to be useful, however, it must reliably provide accurate determinations about the public or private nature of individuals or entities in particular circumstances. 236 Essentially, the state action doctrine is a device that permits the federal courts to balance the interests of private individuals and entities in being free from constitutional regulation against the public's countervailing interest in ensuring that the government and its agents do not disregard constitutional constraints. The current approach to state action analysis unduly favors the interests of private individuals and entities in being unregulated; moreover, it invites courts to require a very high burden of proof for establishing government responsibility for private conduct, while at the same time excusing them from making searching inquiries into the government's potential responsibility for the private conduct at issue. The state action doctrine can best serve its legitimate objectives if reviewing courts are required to engage in case-specific, factually intensive state action inquiries.
In sum, the state action doctrine is and, of necessity, must remain something of a legal briarpatch. Simplistic tests and other attempts to provide an artificial sense of order cannot tame the fundamental nature of the inquiry, which is wild, overgrown, and seemingly unmanageable. Like rabbits, judges should be comfortable maneuvering in the briarpatch; exercising discretion and making hard choices should come naturally to members of the judiciary. As Justice Scalia noted, the terrain of the state action doctrine is "difficult"237 to traverse, and so it must be if the federal courts are to make accurate state action determinations. It's time to go back to the briarpatch. 236. As Justice Douglas explained, "generalizations do not decide concrete cases." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) . The federal judiciary, however, all too often acts as though the state action glosses, which are but "generalizations," actually decide concrete cases. See generally LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 188-89 (arguing that judges must "come to recognize the steady and open checking of results against sense and decency as an ofcourseness of our system of precedent when that system is working right").
237. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
